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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: EMINENT
DOMAIN AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Matthew J. Parlow*
The continuing controversy' regarding Kelo v. City of
New London2 demonstrates that there are a number of
problems and tensions associated with eminent domain that
entice scholars. This article addresses one such problem: the
singular link between eminent domain and affordable
housing. Though rarely discussed, this link reveals a long
* Assistant Professor of Law and Acting Director for the Center for Land
Resources, Chapman University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; B.A.,
Loyola Marymount University. I am grateful to Professors Janine Young Kim,
Donald J. Kochan, and Carol M. Rose for their thoughts on this article; to Victor
Pham and Stephanie Rothberg for their diligent research assistance; to Lisa
Chen, Jamie Holian, Mita Patel, and the staff of the Santa Clara Law Review
for inviting me to participate in this symposium and for their research and
editing assistance; and to Chapman University School of Law for its financial
support.
1. See, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of New London-Wrongly
Decided and a Missed Opportunity for Principled Line Drawing with Respect to
Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REV. 17, 17 (2006) (noting the intense and
sustained debate regarding the merits of the Kelo decision); Timothy J. Dowling,
How to Think About Kelo After the Shouting Stops, 38 URB. LAW. 191, 191-92
(2006) (detailing the varied and numerous responses to the Kelo decision,
including death threats received by City of New London officials); Richard A.
Epstein, The Public Use, Public Trust, & Public Benefit: Could Both Cooley and
Kelo Be Wrong?, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 125, 125-31 (2006) (noting and praising the
public outcry following the Kelo decision).
2. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3. Conventional wisdom in the real estate market dictates that housing is
affordable when a family pays no more than thirty percent of its income on rent
and utilities-if they are renting-or on mortgage, property taxes, insurance,
and utilities if they own the home. However, affordable housing is also used to
describe housing for low-income, very low-income, and extremely low-income
renters or buyers. See infra note 18. In this article, I use the term "affordable
housing" to refer to either privately owned housing made available only to those
who meet a certain income threshold or to government-owned public housing.
There are many other forms of affordable housing, such as federally subsidized
mortgages and Section 8 housing. See Kristin A. Siegesmund, The Looming
Subsidized Housing Crisis, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1123, 1127-31 (2000). At
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history of cities' 4 use of their eminent domain power to
advance development projects that rarely include affordable
housing. Moreover, when cities condemn property through
eminent domain to further new development projects, they
often do so in a manner that undermines many of the goals of
building more affordable housing.5 As the need for affordable
housing increases, cities' taking of private property for "public
purposes" '6 has helped decrease the number of affordable
housing units instead of helping keep up with the demand.
This interplay between eminent domain and affordable
housing raises concerns from a social justice perspective as
well as an economic perspective.
Part I of this article tells the story of the building of
Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles. This example highlights the
broken promises underlying the lofty rhetoric of "public

points in the article, I also refer to private rental housing that is affordable to
low-income, very low-income, and extremely low-income renters, but which is
available on the open market-that is, not restricted by government-subsidized
programs. See infra text accompanying notes 48-49.
4. In this article, I use terms "cities" and "local governments"
interchangeably and broadly to refer to local government entities-largely
cities, but also including, counties, school districts, water districts, and the
like-that have the authority to exercise eminent domain powers.
5. Approximately twenty-five states require a housing element in their
See Daniel R. Mandelker, The
respective cities' comprehensive plans.
Affordable Housing Element in Comprehensive Plans, 30 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV.
555, 556-58 (2003). A comprehensive (or general) plan can be viewed as a
vision, a blueprint, a land use guide, a remedy, or even as a process. See
William C. Baer, General Plan Evaluation Criteria:An Approach to Making
However, a
Better Plans, 63 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 329, 333-34 (1997).
comprehensive plan is generally accepted as the overarching guide to zoning
and land use development in a city or region. Many states require cities to adopt
comprehensive plans that include general policies-known as elementsconsistent with meeting the needs of the community in a variety of different
areas, including housing. In its comprehensive plan, a city adopts a housing
element that details the housing needs of its residents and future residents and
provides a general policy approach for meeting these needs. Many states that
mandate housing elements in their comprehensive plans additionally require
cities to specifically address the affordable housing needs of its residents and to
craft a policy for meeting that need. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(c)
(requiring every local government in the state to adopt a housing element as
part of its general plan); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65583(a)(6) (requiring a local
government housing element in a general plan to assess its existing and
projected housing needs, including in special need areas like the homeless); FLA.
STAT. § 163.3177(6)(f)(1)(d) (requiring a local government comprehensive plan to
include a housing element that provides a plan for housing low-income, very
low-income, and moderate-income families).
6. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661-62.
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purpose," especially with regard to affordable housing. Part
II discusses some of the problems associated with the link
between eminent domain and affordable housing. This
discussion includes the lack of affordable housing, the
increased need for affordable housing, and the economic
consequences stemming from this divide. Part III analyzes
the ongoing debate regarding the proper definition of a
constitutional "public use" and how competing views
marginalize affordable housing. Part IV explores how cities'
use of eminent domain for economic development projects
actually thwart and undermine affordable housing efforts.
Finally, Part V briefly highlights some potential solutions
that address the need for affordable housing and mitigate
against the current trends in cities' exercise of their eminent
domain power that frustrate this goal.
I.

CHAVEZ RAVINE, DODGER STADIUM, AND SOCIAL
INEQUITIES

Although Kelo is the latest case to catch the public's
attention, many others have spurred controversy regarding a
city's use of eminent domain.7 One particularly compelling
example that plainly and movingly illustrates some of the
social justice issues surrounding eminent domain power used
to displace members of poor, often ethnic minority,
communities is the razing of Chavez Ravine-upon which
Dodger Stadium was built-in the 1950s.
Dodger Stadium is located on a 300-acre parcel of land
just north of downtown Los Angeles known as Chavez Ravine.
Up until the 1950s, Chavez Ravine was home to generations
of Mexican-Americans-a poor, though close-knit, community
with homes, churches, schools, and even small farms.'

7. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled
by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After
Kelo v. City of New London. An Argument for Banning Economic Development
Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 510-16 (2006) (arguing that Berman,
Midkiff, and Poletown served to erode the public use clause for economic
development purposes prior to Kelo); Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad
Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAW. 201, 208-15 (2006)
(detailing the controversy surrounding the Berman and Midkiff decisions).
8. ERIC AVILA, POPULAR CULTURE IN THE AGE OF WHITE FLIGHT: FEAR
AND FANTASY IN SUBURBAN Los ANGELES 156-58 (2004).
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Spurred by the Federal Housing Act of 1949-which granted
federal money for cities to build public housing-Mayor
Fletcher Bowron and other elected officials in the City of Los
Angeles voted to build thousands of affordable housing units
in Chavez Ravine.' Using the power of eminent domain, the
City razed nearly the entire community over the period from
1952 to 1953. Many of the residents left voluntarily-the
City bought their homes-with the promise that they would
get their choice of homes in the new public housing
community.1 ° However, other residents resisted the City's
actions and were evicted from their homes-some with
compensation, and others without."
Despite this effort to clear the land, the public housing
project never came to fruition.1 2 Norris Poulson was elected
mayor in 1953, and with the new administration came 13a
reversal in the City's position on the public housing project.
Following Mayor Poulson's lead, the City negotiated a deal
with the federal government to abandon the public housing
project with the stipulation that the nearly-vacant land be
used for a "public purpose."' 4 The City then coaxed the
Brooklyn Dodgers to relocate to Los Angeles with the promise
of a new stadium to be built on Chavez Ravine. Though the
use of the land as a sports stadium and the City's deal with
the Dodgers were challenged in court, the California Supreme
Court ultimately concluded that both were legally tenable.'

9. Id. at 156. The City of Los Angeles secured federal funding for the
construction of the public housing project under the Taft-Ellender-Wagner Bill
of 1949.
10. See id. (Chavez Ravine residents were promised that "'this project is
going to be built for you, we'll give you temporary housing... [Ylou'll have first
priority, you can have whatever you want'" (quoting interview by Eric Avila
with Frank Wilkinson, in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 24, 1996)).
11. See id. at 166.
12. Id. at 156-57.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 162 ("The city's deed to the land explicitly stated that the land
was to be used 'for public purposes only.'"). For a discussion of the differing
perspectives on the proper use of the term "public use" or "public purpose," see
infra text accompanying notes 32-44.
15. City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 423, 433-36 (1959)
(holding that the building of a new sports stadium and the presence of a major
league baseball team provided direct and legitimate public purposes and that
benefits gained solely by the Dodgers were incidental and immaterial). Cities
taking private property for one stated public purpose and then later switching
the use of the property to a different public purpose continues today. See, e.g.,
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Shortly thereafter, in 1962, the Dodgers' tenure at Dodger
Stadium began.
The Chavez Ravine story is one of gentrification and
economic revitalization and raises questions about social
justice. The City originally used its eminent domain power to
replace the poor Mexican-American community's existing
housing with thousands of affordable housing units that
would have resulted in a net increase in the number of lowincome housing units.16
The backers of this project
envisioned a public housing community that served the poor,
working-class Mexican-American families that had been
displaced, along with others similarly situated. The City thus
initially used its eminent domain power for the public
purpose of providing affordable housing to the City's working
poor.
However, the wealthy elite in the City-developers and
other politically powerful insiders-instead
saw an
opportunity for their own financial gain and the City's vitality
through a different use of the property, and launched the
crusade that ultimately killed the project. 7 They eventually
settled upon a sports stadium with the purpose of luring the
Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles. By attracting the Dodgers,
City leaders believed that Los Angeles would attract more
businesses and raise its profile nationally by becoming a "big
league" city.'"
For the City's decision-makers, this goal
superseded the vision of providing more affordable housing
opportunities for Los Angeles's working poor.
Patrick McGreevy, Land Seized for Animal Shelter May Be Sold to DeveloperDonor, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006, at Al (noting that the City of Los Angeles
initially condemned three acres of land in South Los Angeles from a private
company for the purpose of building a new animal shelter, but one year later,
the City is considering selling the property to two private furniture

manufacturing companies).
16. See AVILA, supra note 8, at 156.
17. See id. at 156-57. Mayor Poulson and the wealthy elite went on a

McCarthyesque witch hunt, branding supporters of the public housing project
as Communists-indeed, even blacklisting thirty Housing Authority officialsand casting a stigma on the project and those advocating for it. Even the Los
Angeles Times got in on the action: "The Times is proud of its part in crying the
alarm against this creeping socialism and in supporting the Mayor who found
the way to stop the creep." Id. at 156.
18. See id. at 160. This quest "to enter the big league of American cities"

coincided with Mayor Poulson and the "downtown establishment" aggressively
pursuing a large-scale redevelopment of downtown Los Angeles. Id. at 155-56.

Up until this point, the City had failed to land a professional sports team.
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Dodger Stadium was built, and with it came the reality
that the City would not build the low income housing for
those displaced by the City's exercise of its eminent domain
power. Residents from the former Chavez Ravine community
had to find alternative accommodations which included living
in over-crowded living quarters, illegal dwellings, and even
transient housing.1 9
This influx of new low-income
purchasers and renters strapped an already tight affordable
housing market for the poor in Los Angeles. What started as
the City's crusade to reshape a run-down neighborhood into
an exemplary public housing community turned into a
quintessential example of how cities can use their power of
eminent domain at the expense of poor, and often ethnic
minority, communities for the interests of private developers
or the city as a whole.
II. THE NEED FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND THE
UNLEARNED LESSONS OF CHAVEZ RAVINE

On the one hand, the story of Chavez Ravine is not a
unique one. As many commentators have noted, cities have
long used their eminent domain powers in such a way as to
benefit private interests. ° On the other hand, the story of
Chavez Ravine is notable because it highlights the striking
disjunction between the dire need for affordable housing
within cities and the legal doctrines and financial incentives
that render addressing this need impracticable."
With the gradual decentralization of urban revitalization
and economic development efforts from the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development to the local level, the
burden to provide more affordable housing has fallen

19. Thomas S. Hines, Field of Dreams; History; the Battle of Chavez Ravine,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1997, at Mi.

20. See, e.g., Jennifer Maude Klemetsrud, The Use of Eminent Domain for
Economic Development, 75 N.D. L. REV. 783 (1999) (explaining how the use of
eminent domain through economic development projects has largely benefited
private interests); Wendell E. Pritchett, The "PublicMenace" of Blight: Urban
Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1
(2003) (detailing federal, state, and local governments' use of eminent domain
for purely private interests through a finding that a particular property was
blighted); Philip Weinberg, Eminent Domain for Private Sports Stadiums: Fair
Ball or Foul?, 35 ENVTL. L. 311 (2005) (tracking city and state use of eminent
domain to build new sports stadiums for professional sports teams).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 22-73.
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increasingly on cities.2 2 However, cities' efforts in creating
affordable housing have lagged woefully behind demand. 23 It
is widely recognized that the need for affordable housingparticularly in major metropolitan areas-has reached a
critical juncture.2" For example, between 1973 and 1995,
more than 2 million affordable housing units were taken off
the rental market.2 5 During that same period, the number of
low-income renters increased.26 Moreover, by 1999, there
were only 4.9 million affordable rental housing units
available for the 7.7 million extremely low-income renter
households seeking them.2 ' These figures demonstrate that
at a time when the affordable housing stock should increase
to accommodate the rising numbers of low-income renters,
22. PAUL R. DOMMEL, DECENTRALIZING URBAN POLICY: CASE STUDIES IN
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 1-46 (1982).
23. See generally LOS ANGELES HOUSING CRISIS TASK FORCE, IN SHORT

SUPPLY 1 (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.lacity.org/lahd/shrtsup2k.PDF
(discussing the affordable housing crisis in Los Angeles); Rental Housing for
America's Poor Families:FartherOut of Reach Than Ever, OUT OF REACH (Nat'l
Low Income Hous. Coalition), 2002, http://www.nlihc.org/oor2002 (last visited
Aug. 23, 2006) (detailing how the number of affordable housing units decreases
annually, while the need increases annually).
24. See Deborah Kenn, ParadiseUnfound: The American Dream of Housing
Justice for All, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 69, 70-73 (1995); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65589.5(a)(1) (stating that "[tihe lack of housing is a critical problem that
threatens the economic, environmental, and social quality of life in California");
Siegesmund, supra note 3, at 1125-26 (detailing the rise in demand for
affordable housing); Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable
Housing: Systemic Issues Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
413, 418-25 (2004).
25. See JENNIFER DASKAL, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER: THE GROWING
SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING 32 (1998), available at

http://www.cbpp.org/615hous.pdf.
26. The income definition levels for affordable housing are based on the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development's Area Median Income
determination that varies for each county and by household size. See HUD
User,
FY
2006
Income
Limits
(Mar.
8,
2006),
http://www.huduser.org/DATASETS/il/ilO6/index.html (last visited Aug. 23,
2006). The income definition levels are based on the following calculations: lowincome is defined as 80% of the county's median income; the very low-income
level is 50% of the county's median income; and the extremely low-income level
is 30% of the county's median income. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV.,
FY 2006 HUD INCOME LIMITS BRIEFING MATERIAL 1, 4-7 (2006), available at
http://www.huduser.org/datasets/il/ilO6/BRIEFING-MATERIALS.pdf.
The
federal and state governments use these income definitions in offering financial
and other incentives to developers to build housing for these different groups.
See, e.g., id. at 8.
27. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY 1 (1999),

available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/h150-99.pdf.
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cities are actually experiencing a loss of affordable housing.
Affordable housing units are eliminated from the rental
housing market for a variety of reasons, but it is clear that a
significant portion of them are converted into market-rate
dwellings by private owners.2 8 For example, since it started
collecting such data, the Fannie Mae Foundation
approximates that private owners have converted more than
150,000 previously United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development-assisted or -insured apartments into
market-rate units.2 9 In fact, the Fannie Mae Foundation
estimates that 2,000 affordable housing units are lost every
month, with forty-five percent of such losses occurring by
conversion to market-rate housing."
Price increases in the sale and rental markets have also
caused declines in the number of affordable housing units.3 '
As housing prices and rents have increased at astronomical
rates in the past six years, the income levels of low-income
households have not kept up proportionately, thus making
private sector, non-government subsidized rental units less
affordable. Although many states have adopted statutes that
attempt to maintain existing levels of affordable housing-by
offering first rights of refusal to tenant or homeowners
associations or to non-profit organizations when owners of
federally assisted affordable housing developments intend to
sell or discontinue participation in the affordable housing
program32-such efforts have not bridged the gap between the
number of affordable housing units lost in the past three
decades and the growing need for such housing.
In any case, successful state efforts to maintain existing
affordable housing stock would represent a partial solution at
28. See Michael Bodaken, Fannie Mae Found., The Increasing Shortage of
Affordable Rental Housing in America: Action Items for Preservation,
www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hff/v4i4-preservation.shtml.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, Number of D.C. Affordable Housing Units
Plunge, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at B1.
32. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65863.11(c), (d)(1)-(4), (e)(2) (West 2004)
(providing tenant associations and non-profit organizations the right of first
refusal, as long as they agree to maintain the housing as affordable for a thirtyyear period); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-45-8 (2004) (ensuring a first right of refusal to
the tenant association, local housing authority, or municipal government when
an owner of federally subsidized affordable housing development intends to sell
or discontinue participation the affordable housing program).
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best, as the number of low-income renters continues to rise in
the United States. 3 Increasing unemployment, as well as the
failure of minimum wage and other hourly wage jobs to keep
up with inflation and standards-of-living
in large
metropolitan regions, are sure to exacerbate the shortage in
affordable housing. 4
The failure of cities to provide housing to its poor raises
obvious social justice issues.3 5 But even if cities do not
recognize a moral obligation to house their poor, they should
be mindful of the impact that the affordable housing shortage
can have on the economic vitality of a city-namely,
disruptions in the labor pool. Shifts in the economy have
moved many unskilled jobs farther away from the low-wage
income earning pool.36 As the cadre of low-income workers
cannot afford to live in a metropolitan area, their meager
wages will be insufficient to attract them to cities to work in
jobs such as janitors, couriers, and the like. Commuting by
car or taxi can be too costly for these workers, particularly
with the recent rise in gas prices.
The use of public
transportation, if available, may also prove untenable from
both time- and money-management perspectives. In this
regard, the geographic distance between low-wage workers
and the unskilled jobs in cities may preclude these workers
from taking such jobs and thus cause significant disruptions
in the job market.
Whether cities will be able to solve this dilemma with the
intelligent use of eminent domain is uncertain. As with so
many social policy issues, there are many perspectives and
complexities involved in housing the poor and providing
access to living wage jobs. What is certain is that neither the
33. DASKAL, supra note 25, at 31.
34. See JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED

2000,
at
1-3
(2001),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/200lpubs/p60-214.pdf.
35. For a compelling description of a community's obligation to share the
responsibility of meeting the housing needs of the poor, see South Burlington
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 726-28 (N.J. 1975) (noting
cities' general welfare obligation to provide affordable and "decent housing" for
the poor in the community).
36. See Thomas A. Brown, Democratizing the American Dream: The Role of
a Regional Housing Legislature in the Productionof Affordable Housing, 37 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 599, 600 (2004).
37. See David Fink, Driving Our Workers Out, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.),
May 16, 2004, at C1.
STATES:
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doctrine of eminent domain, nor the practical incentives for
its use, makes it likely that cities will choose eminent domain
as a tool to address these problems.
III. THE EMINENT DOMAIN DOCTRINE: "PUBLIC USE" OR
"PUBLIC PURPOSE," AND WHERE DOES AFFORDABLE HOUSING
FIT?

The ongoing debate about the proper definition of a
constitutional "public use" for the purposes of eminent
domain provides a relevant context within which to
understand the state of affordable housing. Over the past
150 years, the Takings Clause" jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court has vacillated between narrow and
broad views of the term "public use," which conditions the
government's use of eminent domain power.
The property rights, or natural law view of "public use,"
asserts that the federal, state, or local government can
constitutionally condemn property only when the general
public actually has direct access to and use of the property
once it is redeveloped. 9
This narrow view argues that
property
rights
are
fundamental
rights
afforded
constitutional protection and that such rights should not be
easily abrogated by a legislative determination that the
taking furthers some "public purpose."4" Thus, the narrow
view interprets the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
as limiting a government's ability to take property by
eminent domain to only those instances where the public can
access and use the property.
A government's exercise of eminent domain to build a
public school, a highway, or a public hospital likely meets this
narrow definition of public use.
Kohl v. United States
provides an example of eminent domain used for narrow
public use.4 ' In Kohl, the United States Supreme Court held
38. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. art. V.

39. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2677-87 (Thomas,
J., dissenting); see also RICHARD EPSTEIN, PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 1 (1985); Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the

Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX.
L. & POL. 49, 54-66 (1998).
40. See Kochan, supra note 39, at 54-65.

41. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
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that the federal government's taking of private property for
the purpose of building a post office was a valid public use. 2
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Nebraska4 3 further demonstrates the
narrow view that governments should not take private
property for other private uses, regardless of the public
benefit. In Pacific Railroad Co., the United States Supreme
Court held that the State of Nebraska could not condemn a
railroad's property in order to convey it to farmers who
needed it for a grain elevator.4 The Court held that this
instance of taking private property for the private use of
another was unconstitutional.4 5
In contrast, a broader view of "public use" encompasses
not only the taking of private property for use by the public,
but also for purposes that benefit the public, even if the public
cannot actively access or use the property. The United States
Supreme Court endorsed this broader view in Berman v.
4 6 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,4 7 and, most
Parker,
recently, in Kelo. Under this broader view, the government
may take private property and transfer it to another private
party as long as the use of the property will serve a "public
Such public purposes can include economic
purpose."48
development, the creation of jobs, and revitalization of
blighted areas, to name but a few.4 9
Unfortunately, both the narrow and broad views of the
takings doctrine marginalize affordable housing in the debate

42. Id. at 373-74.
43. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
44. Id. at 417.
45. Id.
46. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Berman, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the condemnation of a department store pursuant to a
redevelopment plan that targeted a blighted area of Washington, D.C. Despite
the fact that the department store itself was not blighted, the Supreme Court
gave deference to the legislative determination that the area as a whole was
blighted and that the use of eminent domain to further the redevelopment plan
was necessary to improve the community. Id. at 31-35.
47. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). In Midkiff, the
United States Supreme Court upheld a State of Hawaii statute that divested fee
simple title interest from lessors and transferred title to lessees in order to
break up the land oligopoly in Hawaii. Id. In finding that such a purpose
constituted a public use, the Supreme Court again granted great deference to
the legislative determination that deconstructing the land oligopoly advanced
the public good. Id. at 241-42.
48. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661-62.
49. Id. at 2665-67.
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over the proper use of eminent domain. Government-owned
affordable housing appears to meet the narrow view of public
use, much like a public school or a government-owned
hospital. In order to use a public school or a governmentowned hospital, a member of the public must meet certain
criteria. For a public school, the criteria usually include
residence in the designated geographic area served by the
public school and having a school-aged child.
For a
government-owned hospital, the primary criterion is that the
member of the public be sick or otherwise in need of medical
care and attention. In addition, for both a public school or a
government-owned hospital, there must be availability at the
facility in order for a member of the public to use it.
Similarly, to use government-owned affordable housing, a
member of the public must meet the criteria set forth by the
city-e.g., having an income level below the poverty leveland there must also be availability in the housing facility.
Assuming that government-owned affordable housing fits
within the narrow view of public use, and the government
seeks to implement such a program, it is still unlikely to lead
to growth of affordable housing. This is because cities need
the private sector's assistance in building and managing such
housing projects, 50 and, unfortunately, affordable housing
owned and operated by private parties would run afoul of the
narrow view of public use. Accordingly, the narrow view of
public use would mandate that a city could only condemn
private property to build government-owned affordable
housing, but not to transfer such property to a private
developer who can more effectively build and operate an
affordable housing complex. It is not surprising, then, that
cities opt to use their eminent domain power toward other
types of projects.
On the other hand, both government-owned and privately
owned affordable housing would meet the requirement of
50. Cities simply do not have the capacity or the personnel to meet the
growing demand for affordable housing by themselves. See Cesar E. Torres, The
Housing Crisis FacingLow Income Families,29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1498, 1502
(1999) (detailing the need for public incentives for private developers to build,
operate, and maintain affordable housing units to keep up with the growing
demand for such units); Note, When Hope Falls Short: HOPE VI, Accountability,
and the Privatizationof Public Housing, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1477, 1488 (2003)
(explaining the need for both public and private efforts to build affordable
housing in order to meet the demand for such rental units).
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public purpose under the broad definition of "public use."
Similar to benefits garnered by other types of economic
redevelopment projects, cities could argue-and courts would
likely agree-that the exercise of eminent domain power to
provide more affordable housing to city residents, whether
government-owned and operated or not, advances a
permissible public purpose under this broader view. In fact,
in New York City Housing Authority v. Muller,51 a state court
upheld as constitutional the New York housing law allowing
cities to use the power of eminent domain to clear blighted
areas and build low-income housing. The court determined
that such action was not a constitutionally impermissible
taking of private property for a private interest because the
proliferation of affordable housing advanced a genuine public
purpose.52
With the Supreme Court's recent preference for the
broader view as evidenced by the Kelo decision, one might
expect to see more examples of cities taking private property
to meet the demand for affordable housing units.53 Ironically,
the broader and more flexible definition of public purpose has
pushed affordable housing further by the wayside. Cities now
have more choices than ever before to use their eminent
domain power to pursue developments that will generate
property or sales tax revenue.54 Such developments are likely
to take the shape of sports stadiums, corporate headquarters,
and manufacturing plants rather than affordable housing,
which will not garner the same kind of revenue or prestige.
As explained below, the public purpose justification for
takings encourages exercises of eminent domain power that
not only stymie efforts to increase affordable housing, but
that actually reduce existing affordable housing stock.
IV. EMINENT DOMAIN IN PRACTICE: BLIGHT,
REDEVELOPMENT, AND REVENUE REALITIES

Given the critical need for more affordable housing
among the poor and the negative economic consequences that
51. N.Y. City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
52. Id. at 156.
53. While some states like New York expressly permit and encourage the
use of eminent domain to build more affordable housing, see N.Y. PRIV. HOUs.
FIN. § 11 (McKinney 2004), such states are the exception rather than the rule.
54. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 498-99.
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are likely to result from its dearth, it is both regrettable and
short-sighted that cities have yet to focus on this issue. This
inattention is especially surprising given the various financial
incentives and land use tools, such as density bonuses, offered
to both cities and private developers by federal, state, and
local governments to build more affordable housing.5 5 The
reason for this state of affairs may be a perverse funding
incentive system that causes cities to use their land use and
eminent domain powers to further development projects other
than affordable housing.
Cities in many states receive a significant portion of their
budget through sales and property tax revenues.56 As a
result, many cities use their land use and eminent domain
powers to advance projects that will increase such revenue.
Ann O'Malley Bowman and Michael A. Pagano refer to such
cities as "Survivalist Cities."57
Survivalist Cities face
budgetary deficits due to increased social service needs and
corresponding expenditures. 8
Accordingly, these cities

55. States such as California and New Jersey lead the country in adopting
the most pro-affordable housing statutes that provide monetary and land use
decision-making incentives to build more affordable housing. See, e.g., CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65915 (West 2004) (expanding the density bonus and other
incentives-such as reductions in site development standards, modifications of
zoning code requirements, or architectural design requirements-available to
developers of affordable housing); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33334.2(2)
(West 2004) (requiring that not less than twenty percent of gross tax increment
generated from a redevelopment project area must be used by the
redevelopment agency to increase and improve the community's supply of
affordable housing); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33413(b)(1) (West 2004)
(requiring that at least thirty percent of all new and rehabilitated units
developed by a redevelopment agency be affordable units). California also
requires every local government to adopt a housing element in its general plan
to help with the development of housing for all income levels, including lowincome. CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 65302(c), 65580(d), 65581(a), 65583(a)(3) (West
2004). For a detailed account of New Jersey's extensive efforts to require cities
and developers to build more affordable housing, see generally John M. Payne,
Fairly Sharing Affordable Housing Obligations: The Mount Laurel Matrix, 22
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 365 (2001).
56. See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What
You Pay For"Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 377-82 (2004).
These cities also receive substantial monies from their respective state
governments. However, such funds are often susceptible to the budgetary
constraints experienced by states in our ever-changing economy.
57. Ann O'Malley Bowman & Michael A. Pagano, Imagining Cityscapes: The
Politics of Urban Development, 8 LAND LINES 1, 4-5 (1996), available at
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/pub-detail.asp?id=525.
58. Id.
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strategically use their land use power-oftentimes including
the exercise of eminent domain-to maximize their tax
revenues in order to decrease their budget deficits and
provide the goods and services that their residents and
businesses expect. 9
With many states cutting their yearly budgetary
allocations to local governments in recent years, many cities
that typically do not face such budgetary strains have also
turned to leveraging new development in this manner. To the
degree that other cities are not so financially constrained and
can use their land use and eminent domain powers for
purposes other than tax revenue generation, they often use
such powers to raise their profile or reputation.6 ° Such
"Expansionist Cities ''61 improve their image and visibility by,
for example, drawing a major employer to the area or by
building a new sports facility to garner the image or label of a
"major league city. '62
This trend has decreased the opportunities to create
affordable housing because such projects tend not to create
new sales tax revenue, 63 and they do not maximize the
59. Accordingly, these cities must attempt to maximize opportunities for
existing income streams such as sales taxes and property taxes, rather than
simply create new ones. Even if such additional revenue streams are or were
within most cities' powers, it is questionable whether the implementation of, for
example, a local income tax would be politically palatable. Cities' existing use of
their land use powers to increase sales and property tax revenue may spark
political opposition for other reasons-such as creating undesirable externalities
like traffic, congestion, pollution, etc.-but such opposition is usually limited to
the immediate neighborhood in which the proposed development project resides.
The existing scheme may be more politically accepted because new residential
and commercial developments that spark an increase in sales and property
taxes are more indirect and site specific in their revenue generation than a
direct tax that would subject the general city population to increased taxation.
Increases in direct taxes such as income taxes often meet intense public
opposition. See, e.g., Susan P. Schoettle & David G. Richardson, Nontraditional
Uses of the Utility Concept to Fund Public Facilities, 25 URB. LAW. 519, 519
(1993) (noting the difficulty local governments confront in meeting increased
demands for social and governmental services, while facing "local opposition to
and revolt against increased taxes").
60. See Bowman & Pagano, supranote 57, at 4-5.
61. See id.
62. See Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities:Are They
Economically Justifiable?, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 483, 489-90 (2002)
(detailing the economic reasons for pursuing, and the psychological benefits of
having, a major league sports team in a city).
63. The possible exception being mixed-use developments with affordable
housing units being built above ground-floor commercial space.
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potential property taxes that can be generated from a new
development. For example, on the same parcel, a commercial
or industrial building may be assessed at a higher value than
market-rate apartments, which in turn will have a greater
value than an affordable housing development (especially if it
is government-owned public housing, which generates no
property tax revenue at all).'
Nor do affordable housing
developments bring the national attention and recognition
that the relocation of a professional sports team or a major
employer does. Therefore, unless citizens place a premium on
affordable housing and thus make it a politically necessary
issue for cities to address, cities will rarely prioritize
affordable housing projects above other development projects.
Of course, such prioritization by cities is perfectly consistent
with the broader view of public purpose under the Supreme
Court's eminent domain jurisprudence. Indeed, in light of
their settled incentive structure, cities can plausibly claim
that they are maximizing utility by favoring revenuegenerating development over affordable housing.
The picture becomes more bleak. Not only do cities fail to
use their eminent domain power to build more affordable
housing units, but they often use their power to raze them. 5
Cities often take property that has existing affordable
housing units owned and operated by private owners. These
units are oftentimes inexpensive, private-sector housing that
do not have ties to government-subsidy programs. They are,
nevertheless, "affordable" housing units in the sense that lowincome residents can afford to rent them and live within the
city. By taking such affordable housing units off the market
by their exercise of eminent domain power, cities reduce the
available housing stock for low-income residents as such units

64. The plight of affordable housing in this regard may be compounded by
what some scholars argue is a judicial bias toward zoning for single family
housing. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the
Solution of RepresentationReinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2005).

65. See Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an Economic Development
Tool: A Proposalto Reform HUD DisplacementPolicy, 2001 DETROIT C.L. MICH.

ST. U. L. REV. 901, 938-39 (2001) (detailing the history of how the loss of
affordable housing caused by eminent domain dates back to Urban Renewal
efforts); see also Terry J. Tondro, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals
Statute: After Ten Years of Hope, Why Only Middling Results?, 23 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 115, 159 (2001) (explaining how the use of eminent domain has been
used to defeat affordable housing proposals).
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are usually replaced by new high-end commercial, residential,
and mixed-use projects.
This phenomenon occurs because cities tend to target socalled "blighted" areas for redevelopment. 6 This practice also
66. Blight is usually comprised of one or more of the following conditions:
high unemployment rates; declining tax bases; dilapidated buildings and
infrastructure; buildings in violation of the building code; high vacancy rates for
commercial, residential, or office buildings; and high crime.
However,
definitions vary by state.
For example, Maryland defines blight as an area in which a majority of
buildings have declined in productivity by reason of obsolescence, depreciation,
or other causes to an extent they no longer justify fundamental repairs and
adequate maintenance. MD. CONST. art. III, § 61 (LexisNexis 2006). In
Maryland, if a municipal bond is used for urban renewal, the city must also
consider five other factors in making a finding of blight: "(1) excessive vacant
land on which structures were previously located; (2) abandoned or vacant
buildings; (3) substandard structures; (4) delinquencies in the payment of real
property taxes; or (5) similar factors that the local governing body determines to
be indicative of blight." MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14-805 (LexisNexis 2006).
Colorado defines blight as an area "that, in its present condition and use
and, by reason of the presence of at least four of the following factors,
substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality, retards
the provision of housing ... or constitutes an economic or social liability, and is
a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare." COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31-25-103(2) (West 1996). Those factors considered in Colorado are: (1)
presence of slum, deteriorated, or deteriorating structures; (2) predominance of
defective or inadequate street layout; (3) faulty lot layout such as size; (4)
deterioration of site or other improvements; (5) unusual topography or
inadequate public improvements or utilities; (6) defective conditions of title
rendering title nonmarketable; (7) conditions posing a danger to life or property
by fire or other causes; (8) buildings that are unsafe for persons to live or work
in because of building code violations, defective design, physical construction,
etc.; (9) environmental contamination of buildings or property; and (10) the
existence of health, safety, or welfare factors requiring high levels of municipal
services; or (11) substantial physical underutilization or vacancy of sites,
buildings, or other improvements). Id. at § 31-25-103(2)(a)-(k.5).
Ohio defines blight as follows:
[An area within a municipality containing a majority of structures
that have been extensively damaged or destroyed by a major disaster,
or that, by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence,
inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or open
spaces, unsafe and unsanitary conditions or the existence of conditions
which endanger lives or properties by fire or other hazards and causes,
or that, by reason of location in an area with inadequate street layout,
incompatible land uses or land use relationships, overcrowding of
buildings on the land, excessive dwelling unit density, or other
identified hazards to health and safety, are conducive to ill health,
transmission of disease, juvenile delinquency and crime and are
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1728.01(E) (West 2004).
Missouri defines a blighted area as an area that,
by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street layout,
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has a long history driven by federal, state, and local
government efforts to revitalize economically distressed
areas, particularly in the inner city. Governments have
endeavored in such revitalization efforts under the guiding
principle that without help, private developers, businesses,
In
and even homeowners would not locate to such areas.
fact, to focus cities' efforts in this regard, some states restrict
city redevelopment agencies to condemning property only in
blighted areas.68
There are both optimistic and cynical ways to view these
issues. On the positive side, there are some obviously benign
Many
motives for the redevelopment of blighted areas.
believe that redevelopment of economically distressed areas
can correct cycles of crime and poverty that often plague the
inner city and harm its residents. 69 From a moral rights
perspective, if a person has allowed his or her property to
become blighted, they are blameworthy and thus there is a
unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements,
improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions
which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any
combination of such factors, retards the provision of housing
accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability or a
menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present
condition and use.
MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805 (Supp. 1998).
67. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33037(b) (West 2004) (stating
"[tihat whenever the redevelopment of blighted areas cannot be accomplished
by private enterprise alone, without public participation and assistance in the
acquisition of land, in planning and in the financing of land assembly, in the
work of clearance, and in the making of improvements necessary therefore, it is
in the public interest to employ the power of eminent domain, to advance or to
expend public funds for these purposes, and to provide a means by which
blighted areas may be redeveloped or rehabilitated").
68. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 403.2 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2102 (West
1999); see also 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp.
2d 1123, 1130-31 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (striking down condemnation that did not
involve blighted property); Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes, 82
Cal. App. 4th 511, 548-60 (2000) (same).
69. See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 1

(2001); Jennifer Forbes, Using Economic Development Programs as Tools for
Urban Revitalization: A Comparison of Empowerment Zones and New Markets
Tax Credits, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 177 (2006). But see Scott L. Cummings,
Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Towards a
Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001)
(arguing that the community economic development movement fails to alleviate
poverty and actually hinders efforts for a coordinated response to the
economically disadvantaged).
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justification for taking their property for redevelopment to
reverse its negative impact on the community. At the same
time, redevelopment of such areas goes hand-in-hand with
the aforementioned drive by cities to maximize their sales
and property tax revenues to serve "public purposes" that
benefit the city as a whole as well as its residents, businesses,
and visitors.7"
Moreover, courts have consistently upheld
condemnation of blighted property or of non-blighted property
in a blighted area under the rationale that alleviating poverty
and other social ills through economic development cannot be
successfully accomplished on a structure-by-structure basis.7 1
Rather, such change occurs by targeting blighted areas as a
whole, even if they include a building that does not pose a
health or safety risk or that is not a blight to the
community.7 2
These are legitimate reasons for taking property, but we
must also recognize that cities' use of eminent domain
primarily in blighted areas raises serious concerns from a
social justice perspective, similar to the concerns raised in the
Chavez Ravine example. Blighted areas are almost always
poor neighborhoods, many of which are populated by ethnic
minority groups.7 3 So the property taken by cities is likely to
be owned or used by the poor, and in those states that limit
eminent domain to only blighted areas, this is the only
property being taken. Use of eminent domain in this manner
directly benefits the wealthy and powerful at the expense of
poor and often ethnic minority communities, exacerbating the
concern that eminent domain will become an even more
powerful land use tool of the elite at the expense of the poor.
This more cynical perspective suggests that the city's land
use decision-making process-including decisions related to
eminent domain-may be subject to capture by powerful
special interests.
The reality is probably somewhere in
between, particularly given the perverse incentive system
created by the funding mechanisms of local governments.

70.
71.
72.
1938);
73.

See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
See id. at 34-36; Dornan v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 200 A. 834, 842 (Pa.
N.Y. City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E. 2d 153, 156 (1936).
See generally Pritchett, supra note 20.
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

With the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, it is unlikely
that there will be a jurisprudential shift in redefining "public
purpose" in a manner that would stem the tide of affordable
housing casualties of eminent domain. Neither Kelo's
endorsement of "public purpose" over traditional "public use,"
nor states' reactions to that decision,"4 offer much hope for
growth in affordable housing. On the contrary, many states
have responded to Kelo by introducing blight-only legislation
that will ultimately reduce the availability of affordable
housing.7 5
Congress's proposed responses to Kelo could also
Senate
potentially undermine affordable housing efforts.
Resolutions 1704 and 1313 and House Resolutions 4128 and
3135 propose prohibiting the use of federal funds for any
development project in which private property is taken by
eminent domain for the purpose of economic development.7 6
House Resolution 3405-also known as the Strengthening the
Ownership of Private Property (STOPP) Act-would bar
federal financial assistance for economic development to a
state or local government that used eminent domain to take
House
property for private commercial development.7 7
Resolution 3315 withholds community development block
grant funds from states and cities that do not prohibit the use
of eminent domain for economic development purposes.78 As
many affordable housing projects are made possible by
federal funds, these bills would severely retard affordable
housing efforts if not amended to exempt expressly the
74. In Kelo, the Supreme Court noted that nothing in its opinion prevents a
state from providing additional protections to private property owners. See Kelo

v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005). The Court's decision
merely provided the base level protection articulated by the Fifth Amendment.
See id.
75. S.B. 68/H.B. 14, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005); A.B. 590, 2005-06
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); A.C.A. 15, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005);
H.D.R. 4634, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); H.D.R. 4663, 184th Gen.
Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); S.B. 5936, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S.B.
2413, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); H.B. 16, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2005); S.B. 26, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005); A.B. 656, 2005 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wis. 2005).
76. S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1704, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3135,
109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
77. H.R. 3405, 109th Cong. (2005).
78. H.R. 3315, 109th Cong. (2005).
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development of affordable housing units.
It is clear that the current thinking among state and
federal legislatures about the doctrine and practice of
eminent domain does not include serious consideration of the
affordable housing problem. Instead, solutions that move
beyond the debate over "public use" versus "public purpose"
must be studied if cities are to address the need for affordable
housing and stop the current trends that frustrate this goal.
One measure may be legislation, either at the local or state
level, that would require private developers who gain land
from a city's exercise of its eminent domain power to provide,
at a minimum, the same number of affordable housing
units-either at the same site or elsewhere in the city-that
were eliminated due to the condemnation. Such a law would
force developers to replace affordable housing units on a oneto-one basis and prevent a reduction in the supply of
affordable housing, although it would not, by itself, keep up
with increasing demand.
Another, perhaps more promising, solution may be the
wider adoption of inclusionary housing or inclusionary zoning
laws. These "inclusionary" laws require developers to build
and offer a certain percentage of affordable housing units
when they build a particular number of market-rate homes in
a redevelopment area, whether the city uses eminent domain
or not to advance the project."9 In this way, whether or not
affordable housing units are taken off the market through the
exercise of eminent domain-as described above-a developer
receiving condemned property would have to build a certain
percentage of housing units at an affordable level.
Inclusionary zoning laws would require a developer to replace
the number of affordable housing units lost by the city's
exercise of eminent domain through such a mandated
percentage applicable to the new development.8 0
More
importantly, in addition to maintaining the level of affordable
housing units, such inclusionary zoning laws would require a
developer-who received property from the city through
eminent domain-to build additional affordable housing units
at the required percentage, even if no affordable housing

79. See Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning:
Successfully CreatingAffordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 973-74 (2002).
80. See id. at 997, 1001.
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units existed on the property previously.'
In this regard,
inclusionary zoning laws could both maintain and increase
the number of affordable housing units in a city if properly
crafted.
To better effectuate the goal of increased affordable
housing units, governments should disallow any "in-lieu" fee
exemption under these two types of laws articulated above.
Many existing inclusionary zoning or inclusionary housing
laws contain provisions that permit developers to pay fees to
the city-for use towards building affordable housing
elsewhere-in lieu of actually building the required affordable
housing on-site.8 2 However, it is questionable how well these
"in lieu" fee exemptions work. The responsibility for building
affordable housing units shifts from the developer-who has
an incentive to build the units in order to build their marketrate housing units and other non-residential portions of the
development-to the city.
And cities' efforts to build
affordable housing units on their own have had mixed
results.83
Cities can also provide more incentives for private
developers to build affordable housing-in addition to tax
increment financing, density bonuses, and other such
development tools-by starting housing trust funds.8 4 With
dwindling federal funding for low-income housing, cities have
looked to establish housing trust funds, which raise money
through various measures-e.g., tax increment financing,
ticket surcharges to entertainment events, and issuance of
bonds. These funds are then used as financial incentives for
private developers to build new affordable housing units and
to preserve existing ones. This approach has had some
traction as there are 350 cities in thirty-seven states that
have created housing trust funds to address their residents'
growing need for affordable housing."
81. See id. at 1011.

82. See id. at 981.
83. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
84. See generally MARY E. BROOKS, HOUSING TRUST FUNDS: A NEW
APPROACH TO FUNDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING: AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND

URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 229-245 (Willem Van Vliet ed.,

1997); see also Joe Hirsh, Housing Trust Funds: Addressing America's
Affordable Housing Crisis, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
218, 218-23 (2005).

85. See Georgia Pabst, Housing Campaign Breaks Ground, MILWAUKEE J.
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Community benefit agreements may provide another
avenue to ensure that developers who gain property for
development through a city's exercise of eminent domain also
build affordable housing.
While community benefit
agreements do not inherently encourage the proliferation of
affordable housing, such agreements could be a useful tool for
a community in need of affordable housing. Community
benefit agreements are legally binding contracts between a
developer and a coalition of community representatives, 6
typically comprised of church, labor, environmental,
affordable housing, and other neighborhood-based groups.
The
developer
negotiates
with
these
community
representatives to identify a series of concessions that the
developer will provide to the community-jobs, environmental
mitigation measures, various infrastructure improvements,
building affordable housing units, etc.-in exchange for the
community's support for the project as it goes through the
political and land use approval process. 8 Community benefit
agreements are legally binding contracts, so the community
can sue the developer if he or she does not follow through on
the promised benefits contained in the agreement. Through
these agreements, communities in need of more affordable
housing units can prioritize this type of concession in
negotiating with developers and can even actively enforce the
building of such units.
Finally, and most radically, states may want to consider
changing the financing system for local governments from the
current system, which causes cities to be overly reliant on
sales tax dollars for their funding.8 9 As a result of sales tax

SENTINEL, Mar. 4, 2005, at B1; see also Janny Scott, Mayor Wins Wide Praise

for Initiatives on Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at B1; Richard Fausset &
Steve Hymon, Mayor to Seek Housing Bond, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at B1.
86. See JULIAN GROSS, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING
DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS
ACCOUNTABLE
9
(2005),
available at
http'//www.californiapartnership.org/downloads/CBA%20Handbook%202005%2
Ofinal.pdf.
87. See id. at 10-11.
88. See id. at 9. The community also waives its right to sue regarding the
development, with the exception of enforcement of rights under the agreement.
Id. at 92.
89. Interestingly, California, Georgia, Tennessee, and Virginia proposed
legislation that would prohibit the use of eminent domain for the primary
purpose of economic development or for improving tax revenue. See Cal. A.B.
590, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); S.B. 86, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
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dependence, cities favor retail development over residential
development-leading to some of the aforementioned
problems when cities exercise their eminent domain power.
By changing the funding system for cities-perhaps to more
of a property tax or state block grant system-states may be
able to provide incentives for cities to build more affordable
residential units and thus possibly alter the current use of
eminent domain power, which leads to the elimination of lowincome housing in favor of sales tax-generating projects.
These solutions raise other questions and obstacles and
may be flawed, but they at least provide the fodder necessary
for a meaningful conversation about how to address some of
the problems raised by the problematic link between the
eminent domain doctrine and affordable housing.
VI. CONCLUSION

The problems with the link between eminent domain and
affordable
housing become
clearer with
a better
understanding of the different factors involved in the complex
web of property rights and competing interests detailed
above. There is the obvious quandary of whether taking the
property owned and used by the poor in favor of the more
affluent or the community as a whole is justified. The poor
who are displaced by such exercises of eminent domain power
have oftentimes-as demonstrated by the Chavez Ravine
example-lived in a community for generations. With the
dearth of affordable housing, the recently displaced may find
themselves forced to move outside of the city-indeed
sometimes to such a prohibitive distance that they must cease
their ties to the city for practical reasons. Though these
residents had a stake and place in the city predating such
economic revitalization efforts, the "first in time" rule in
property law and other concepts of prior ownership rights as
a protection from the taking of one's property have been
intermittently and selectively applied to favor those in power
or with political influence, providing no recourse or protection

(Ga. 2005); Tenn. S.B. 2413, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); H.B.
2426/S.B. 2418, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); S.B. 2422, 104th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); S.B. 1271, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2005).
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to the displaced.9 0 This obvious dilemma raises the question
of whether cities are open to the poor or whether cities are
transforming into havens only for the rich or tax-revenue
generating developments.
We must move away from the trend of judging the
success of condemnation and redevelopment projects by the
economic stimulus-specifically, sales tax and property tax
revenue generation-for the formerly blighted area. Instead,
we must consider less obvious market-value factors like the
unintended consequences of a reduction in affordable housing
and the attendant potential impacts on the low-wage labor
pool. Part of this paradigm shift may also require rethinking
how local governments are funded. Moreover, we must also
adopt new laws and policies that ensure that cities and
private developers, at the very least, replace the affordable
housing that once stood on properties that were condemned
for new, upscale developments. Solutions will not come from
the judiciary, as Kelo has-perhaps unintentionally-set the
target for eminent domain directly on the poor, further
exacerbating the problems facing affordable housing. The
proposed responses to Kelo by Congress and many state
legislatures compound the problem. When all the posturing
and positioning from the post-Kelo fallout has subsided, we
must have an honest discussion about how to unravel some of
the problems stemming from the link between affordable
housing and eminent domain.

90. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).

